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Recognition and democracy: Honneth’s concept of soc ia l  l i f e .  
Introduction 
This speech aims to emphasize the link there is between recognition and democracy. I’d like 
to show how the recent revival of the concept of recognition in political and philosophical 
fields can lead to a renewal in the current reflection about democracy. For that purpose, I will 
focus on some texts from Axel Honneth, whose ethics of recognition entails in my opinion a 
potential for rethinking democracy. This argument may be astonishing as far as in most of his 
texts, Honneth only skims over the subject. He is even sometimes stigmatised as an apolitical 
thinker. This viewpoint is probably due to a misunderstanding concerning his position 
towards identity claims and the cultural definition of the identity and concerning his concept 
of politics.  In the debate with Nancy Fraser which was published under the title 
“redistribution or recognition?”, Honneth quotes Bourdieu in La Misère du monde (the Misery 
of the world) about the definition of politics. In his opinion, the concept of politics should 
entail “the diffuse expectations and hopes from the citizens”1. The innovative potential from 
Honneth’s theory relies on the necessary consideration of an affective side of social 
experiences and in an opening of the political world to the social world. Therefore in this 
speech I will intend to focus on the problematic of the social field in its relation to democracy 
and in particular on Honneth’s concept of social life. I’d like to show how some punctual 
aspects of his reflection on recognition could constitute appropriate leads in order to enlarge 
and perhaps give new impulsions to the contemporary reflections about democracy. 
After briefly referring to the historical and philosophical context in which the concept of 
recognition knew a revival in the 80’s and 90’s and in particular of the German reception of 
the debate between Liberals and Communautarians, I’ll focus on the procedural concept of 
democracy and the problem of the access to the public sphere in order to explain, in a last 
step, in what way we could speak about Honneth’s viewpoint of democracy as a social ideal.  
I. Revival from the concept of recognition and reflection about democracy
1 „Unformuliertes und unformulierbares Unbehagen, welches die politischen Organisationen nicht wahrnehmen 
und erst recht nicht in ihre Verantwortung nehmen können, verfügen sie doch nur über die verstaubte Kategorie 
des Sozialen, um dieses Unbehagen zu denken. Um dieser Rolle gerecht werden zu können, müssten sie erst 
einmal ihre aus vergangenen Tagen herübergerettete engstirnige Auffassung von Politik selbst erweitern und 
nicht nur für die von den verschiedenen sozialen Bewegungen  u. a. Ökologischer, antirassistischer oder 
feministischer Orientierung öffentlich angemeldeten Forderungen öffnen, sondern ebenso die diffusen 
Erwartungen und Hoffnungen der Bürger einbeziehen“, Umverteilung oder Anerkennung,, p. 141-142. 
Maiwenn Roudaut
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So, to start with: how did the concept of recognition meet a revival at the end of the last 
century and what impact did it have on diverse thoughts about democracy? 
 
A. (Context from the revival of recognition) 
The resurgence of the concept of recognition in the philosophical field coincides with the 
apparition of a political discourse of recognition, in particular in the sphere of social, cultural, 
sexual and minority struggles. Many reflections about recognition rely on the historical 
examples of the civil rights movement, the feminist demands in the 70’s and also the 
problems linked to postcolonization. Using the concept of “the right to difference”, these 
groups claim for the recognition of their specific identities.  
One of the most significant philosophical debates concerning these issues is the debate 
between Liberals and Communautarians in North America in the 1980’s. My purpose here is 
not to get into the details of the complex stances of the debate, but to stress on the impact it 
had on the reflections about democracy and its conceptual link to recognition. 
 In the communautarian thoughts, the concept of recognition plays a critical role. It represents 
a means to oppose to liberal tolerance, that is to say to the neutrality of the state towards the 
different conceptions of good life and more generally towards the private life of individuals. 
The individual is part of a community that plays a substantial role in his integration to society 
and in so far, this part of the individual identity has to be recognised in its specificity. Of 
course, this statement raises a lot of questions, the first one being the question of the 
definition of identity and community. The danger is to absolutise the concept of identity, 
making it a fix and immutable characterization of the individual and to simplify the social 
process of integration into a cultural problem. But the merit of the debate with all its 
ramifications is to have put at the centre of political discussions the problems concerning the 
integration and the creation of common values in plural societies. Indeed, all these thinkers 
are trying to take up the challenge of postmodernity. They have to conceptualise the society 
and the community in the context of the decline of normativity. In this sense, the whole 
debate around recognition shows (voluntarily or not) the real problems democracy thoughts 
have to face in the postmodern context: If identity has to be recreated, then it is the 
democratic identity, that is to say the mediation between individual and community and 
between society and community. In this perspective, the German reception of the debate 
introduces an innovative point of view. 
 
 
  Page 3 
B. (Reception of the debate in Frankfurt and contribution to a renewal of 
democracy thoughts) 
Following the general argument from E. Renault in his article “Entre libéralisme et 
communautarisme: une troisième voie?”2 (“Between Liberalism and Communautarism: a 
third way?”), I’d like to question briefly how the American debate was met by the successors 
of the Critical theory. The German thinkers proceed to a redefinition of the central 
problematic of the debate in what we call the “continental” context of questions about 
nationality, citizenship and democratic deliberation. 
The first aspect of this redefinition is a methodological one. The aim of the German thinkers 
is to proceed to a synthesis of both viewpoints, to think “over Liberalism and 
Communautarism” as Rainer Forst says3. In this perspective, the methodological principles 
inherited from the young Critical theory constitute an important base, in particular the 
definition of critique given by Horkheimer in 1931. The critical side of the theory relies on the 
unity from the descriptive and the normative. Critical philosophers refuse to distinguish 
between the properly normative aspect of the reflection and its social efficiency. Their 
approach of the social context entails the search for a transcendental immanence, which could 
be the anchor of the critique. Therefore, the social field constitutes the criterion of 
normativity. As far as the theory arises from a specific approach of social immanence, the 
contemporary Critical thinkers oppose to the abstract and reconstructive liberal theory and 
each of them from one’s own perspective to the Theory of justice of John Rawls. For E. 
Renault, the political consequence of such a methodological premise is the reformulation of 
the communautarian critique in a non communautarian way. 
But at the same time, most of Critical thinkers also argue against the communautarian critique 
of the liberal unencumbered self. Following the political and critical premises of the human 
interest to emancipation, they try to avoid becoming bogged down in a contextual 
argumentation. That’s the reason why these thinkers refuse to stick to identity and culture in 
the way it is debated on in America. Habermas’ definition of recognition in die Einbeziehung 
des Anderen and Honneth’s critical point of view towards Fraser’s americanocentrism in the 
controversy about redistribution and recognition are so many examples of the refusal of this 
tight perspective. On this point, they encounter the liberal requirements of the definition of 
universal rights. But the concept of quasi-transcendental interests is also a means to revitalize 
                                                
2 Emmanuel Renault, « Entre Libéralisme et communautarisme : une troisième voie ? », in : Emmanuel Renault 
et Yves Sintomer, Où en est la théorie critique ?, La Découverte, Paris 2003. 
3 Rainer Forst, « Kommunitarismus und Liberalismus – Stationen einer Debatte », in : Axel HONNETH (dir.), 
Kommunitarismus. Eine Debatte über die moralischen Grundlagen moderner Gesellschaften, Campus Verlag, 
Frankfurt am Main, 1993. 
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the liberal conception of the negative liberty. Universal rights are conceived as ways to 
oppose to social and cultural contexts, which can be negations of liberty. One might think of 
Wellmer’s definition of the negative liberty as the right “to be and to act as a dissident” in an 
essay called “Bedingungen einer demokratischen Kultur. Zur Debatte zwischen Liberalen und 
Kommunitaristen”4. What is at stake through this revitalization of the concept of social life is 
the renewal of the central questions about democracy, such as the redefinition of the line 
between private and public sphere and of the notion of negative liberty, which is at the centre 
of the controversy between Liberals and Communautarians. For that purpose, the common 
base of the German reflections is intersubjectivity. Communication becomes a central point in 
the integrative process of democracies. 
 
II. The problem of the access to public sphere 
A. (methodological divergence) 
For now, I’d like to grasp on the theme of the procedural democracy model developed by 
Habermas and the problem of the access to public sphere through Honneth’s specific 
perspective of the recognition. Honneth’s relation to his predecessor Habermas is ambivalent 
and evolves with time. In his first texts, Honneth sees in the role played by intersubjectivity 
and communication in Habermas’ ethics of the discourse the central point of a renewal of the 
Critical theory. It liberates the Critical tradition from its Marxian scoria and first of all from 
the absolutising paradigm of production and work (Kritik der Macht). Therefore, Honneth’s 
ethics of recognition was not conceived in opposition, but in continuation to Habermas’ 
position. But at the same time, the main difference between these two successors of the 
Critical theory - which is a methodological one – enables Honneth to develop an independent 
and polemic theory of the social world through his reflections about recognition. Honneth’s 
thoughts are upstream of Habermas’ theory. Whereas Habermas considers intersubjective 
communication as an appropriate anchor to his analysis of social integration, Honneth focuses 
on the normative criterion of the experience of injustice. His perspective is the one of the 
pathological aspects of social life. This negative viewpoint aims at considering the affective, 
qualitative and individual side of injustice, which is directly linked to (the experience of) 
recognition (or its denial). So whereas Habermas presupposes (most of the time implicitly) the 
existence of cultural and institutional conditions making the expression of arguments and 
                                                
4 Albrecht Wellmer, « Bedingungen einer demokratischen Kultur. Zur Debatte zwischen Liberalen und 
Kommunitaristen », in : Endspiele. Die unversöhnliche Moderne. Essays und Vorträge, Suhrkamp, Frankfurt am 
Main 1993, p. 54-80. 
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opinions possible in the democratic society, Honneth questions these conditions of possibility 
and consequently the process of integration. In so far, his theory of recognition corresponds to 
an analysis of the social implications and premises of Habermas’ theory.  
 
 
B. (political implications) 
The methodological divergence leads Honneth to the development of independent political 
reflections lying on the critique of Habermas’ procedural model of democracy. One of the 
first critiques formulated as such, which Honneth addresses to Habermas consists of a 
revelation of the implicit criterion of justice in Habermas’ theory. As for Honneth, Habermas 
doesn’t want to accept the necessary substantial part of his theory of the discourse and as such 
tries to avoid the questions linked to its definition. But this substantial criterion is the one, 
which justifies the distance there is between the institutionalised rule on the one hand and the 
general will and consensus on the other hand. In his text called Verdinglichung, Honneth 
highlights the fact that societies can show other normative failures than the ones linked to a 
breach of general principles of justice5. That’s also the reason why Honneth criticises, in 
Habermas’ procedural model of democracy, the missing of a consideration of social struggles 
in the process of social reproduction and of the moral justification of the democratic 
motivations of the individual. These critiques are in line with the major critiques addressed to 
Habermas, but the originality of Honneth lies on the references he summons in order to justify 
his point of view and in the way he tries to proceed to a synthesis of various European 
thoughts and traditions. In a very important text, extracted from Das Andere der 
Gerechtigkeit, Honneth refers to the contemporary normative turn of poststructural ethics as a 
challenge for Habermas’ theory. The first part of the text reminds of Lyotard’s concept of 
“linguistic play” aiming at questioning the consensual aspect of the language in Habermas’ 
ethics of the discourse. What is at stake in Lyotard’s concept of the dissensus is the distance 
that arises between the judging discourse and the discourse of the judged person. On that 
point, it encounters the honnethian concept of recognition. According to Habermas, the 
recognition intervenes only after the demand for recognition has passed the line of the public 
sphere, that is to say has been expressed in the common language of the publicity and thus has 
                                                
5 „Die Gesellschaftskritik hat sich in den letzten drei Jahrzehnten im wesentlichen darauf beschränkt, die 
normative Ordnung von Gesellschaften daran zu messen, ob sie bestimmten Prinzipien der Gerechtigkeit 
genügen; dabei hat sie bei allen Erfolgen in der Begründung solcher Standards, bei aller Differenzierung der 
zugrundelegenden Hinsichten aus den Augen verloren, dass Gesellschaften auch in einem anderen Sinn normativ 
scheitern können als in der Verletzung von allgemein gültigen Gerechtigkeitsprinzipien“, Verdinglichung, p.106 
-107 
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been subjected to the test of discussion. Whereas according to Honneth, the recognition comes 
first and is the condition to a fair integration to the public space. The Honnethian concept of 
recognition lays the stress on the negative side of the procedural democracy that a priori 
excludes, with its focalisation on the political aspect of deliberation, some forms of social 
conflicts and protests; The article about the postmodern ethics has to be read in parallel with 
the article entitled “Moralbewusstsein und soziale Klassenherrschaft”. This article belongs to 
a former period of Honneth’s work. Honneth himself admits in the foreword to Das Andere 
der Gerechtigkeit that many faults can be found in this article. But he decided to publish it in 
2000 in order to put forward the reflections, which led him to his ethics of recognition. The 
starting point of his argumentation is also here the insufficiency of Habermas’ concept of 
public space. Struggles for social recognition and conflicts in the sphere of work are so many 
moral condemnations of the existing social order. As for him, the problems encountered by 
these claims for social justice in order to be positively formulated, are linked with the 
existence in the society of complex exclusion mechanisms. Those take two main forms: on 
one side the cultural exclusion of the dominated, and on the other side the individualisation of 
the conscience of injustice. That’s the reason why Honneth insists on rethinking the necessary 
social conditions to a real integration. Through his references, Honneth enlarges the 
philosophical dialogue concerning democracy. 
 
III. democracy as a “social ideal” 
Finally I’d like to outline the definition of democracy as a “social ideal” standing out from 
different political thoughts scattered in Honneth’s work. In this perspective, I’d like to 
consider one very significant text called “Demokratie als reflexive Kooperation. John Dewey 
und die Demokratietheorie der Gegenwart”. It is one of the few texts dealing directly with 
political issues and as such a text, which draws the problematic line of Honneth’s 
argumentation in this field. The reference to Dewey may once more be an astonishing one, as 
far as he has also been an important reference of Habermas. While Habermas insists on the 
epistemological dimension from Dewey’s thoughts, Honneth’s interest has to do with his 
action-theoretic concept of thinking and with its consequences on the political field. The 
reference to Dewey and to his original concept of feeling already appears in Kampf um 
Anerkennung. As for Honneth, Dewey’s pragmatic thesis, and especially his thoughts about 
democracy in The Public and its problems, represents a relevant argument to go beyond 
republicanism and also proceduralism concerning the questions of democracy. This may 
sound paradoxical, as far as Habermas himself mentions Dewey in Zeit der Übergänge as a 
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potential inspiration for the “Republic of Berlin”. So I’d like to focus on the main aspects of 
Dewey’s reflection used by Honneth in order to surpass Habermas’ theory. 
 
A. (The link between social and political world in the redefinition of democracy) 
As for Honneth, the current discussion about democracy disputes the validity of the formation 
of the general will conceptualised in political liberalism. Republicanism and proceduralism 
both try to give substance to the empty liberal conceptualisation of the general will through a 
representation of the publicity. In this perspective, the originality of Dewey lies for Honneth 
in the importance he attaches in his own definition of publicity to the prepolitical sphere6. The 
central point of Dewey’s conception of democracy is the notion of social cooperation, through 
which he perceives a means to recreate a kind of mediation between individual, community 
and society. From a methodological point of view, this concept also enables the creation of a 
new link between the political sphere and the social one. There is in Dewey’s reflections a 
necessary link between prepolitical associations and integration of the individual. This 
assertion has to be understood from an intersubjective viewpoint on socialisation. The 
capacities and needs of the individual can only be stabilised through recognition by his 
partners in the social cooperation. Thus, individual liberty is linked with this prepolitical 
recognition. Of course, the concept of social cooperation reminds us here of the honnethian 
concept of solidarity and of the third sphere of recognition developed in Kampf um 
Anerkennung. The positive side of Dewey’s viewpoint compared with the tradition of 
republicanism (which is represented by Arendt in Honneth’s article) is therefore to explain the 
political implication of the individual from a prepolitical perspective and in this sense to break 
with the notion of political virtue. As for Dewey, the human being is as political as consuming 
or sportive. Therefore, Dewey’s reflections are appropriate to rethink democracy in the 
contemporary context of a disaffection towards politics and of a disintegration of the society. 
The communicative liberty of the individual and also his access to publicity hasn’t to do with 
the intersubjective discourse (as in Habermas’ ethics of the discourse), but with the individual 
involvement in the social cooperation. As a consequence, Dewey outlines a concept of 
responsibility based on a redefinition of the relation between the individual and his 
environment. Dewey defines this relation as a qualitative and holistic reaction to the fulfilling 
                                                
6 „öffentlich ist jeweils jene Sphäre sozialen Handels, von der eine Gruppe der Gesellschaft mit Erfolg 
nachweisen kann, dass sie aufgrund der Hervorbringung übergreifender Konsequenzen einer allgemeinen 
Regelung bedarf; und eine Öffentlichkeit besteht demnach aus dem Kreis derjenigen Bürgerinnen und Bürger, 
die aufgrund einer gemeinsam erlebten Betroffenheit die Überzeugung teilen, dass sie sich mit dem Ziel der 
administrativen Kontrolle der entsprechenden Interaktion an den Rest der Gesellschaft zu wenden haben“, 
„Demokratie als reflexive Kooperation“, in; Das Andere der Gerechtigkeit, p. 300. 
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or not of his attempts. In this way, Dewey’s conception of the publicity entails the dimension 
of a common experience, on which Honneth also focuses 70 years later. This part of Dewey’s 
reflections explains the constitution not of a democratic publicity but I think of multiple 
prepolitical publicities. Now the question is: how do all these publicities get in touch with? 
Here Dewey’s conception of the state intervenes through a new demarcation between public 
and private sphere. Thus, an interaction becomes a public problem when it affects the people 
who do not belong to the previous interaction. In that perspective, the state is a kind of second 
order association whose mission aims at resolving the problems engendered by these 
consequences of interaction and at regulating the contacts between the various prepolitical 
spheres of publicity. The state is therefore the condition of respect-achievement. In Dewey’s 
thoughts the access to publicity consists of three steps: the personal commitment of the 
individual in a prepolitical association, the contribution to social cooperation and the respect 
of other associations. The main question this concept raises is now to understand how the 
motivations of the individual could be involved in a prepolitical association. The starting 
point of Dewey’s conceptualisation of democracy on that issue is the fair division of work. 
 
B. (Sphere of work and publicity) 
Through the detour via Dewey’s reflections, Honneth comes across the sphere of work again, 
which plays an important role in his ethics of recognition. In comparison with Habermas, 
Honneth tries to reintroduce the moral aspect of the concept of work in his political 
reflections. But he also refuses to absolutise the paradigm of work7. As for Honneth, the 
sphere of work only constitutes an appropriate example of the necessity for the individual to 
be recognised beyond the sphere of equality rights as a human being whose social 
contribution itself has a value. It also constitutes a sphere in which the moral condemnation of 
society can arise. Inspired by Foucault’s reflections in L’Ordre du discours, Honneth tries to 
show that the exclusion of some social claims through linguistic mechanisms of control 
coincides with an institutionalised repression from the history of social movements in general 
                                                
7 « mit der Chance, einer ökonomisch entlohnten und somit sozial geregelten Arbeit nachzugehen, ist auch heute 
noch der Erwerb jener Form von Anerkennung verknüpft, die ich soziale Wertschätzung genannt habe. 
Andererseits aber darf diese Aufwertung der Arbeitserfahrung auch nicht dazu führen, noch einmal hinter das 
Niveau zurückzufallen, das Habermas mit seiner kategorialen Entschlakkung des Arbeitsbegriffs bereits vor 20 
Jahren gesetzt hatte; denn in der marxistischen Tradition und selbst noch bei Horkheimer ist die gesellschaftliche 
Arbeit geschichtsphilosophisch so sehr zu einem Bildungsfaktor überhöht worden, dass nur das Gegenmittel 
eines möglich nuchternen, von normativen Implikationen gereinigten Begriffs der Arbeit vor der Gefahr einer 
solchen Illusionsbildung schützen kann. Aus diesen gegenläufigen Tendenzen erwächst die Frage, bis zu welcher 
Schwelle der Begriff der Arbeit neutralisiert werden kann, ohne damit zugleich die Bedeutung einer zentralen 
Quelle von moralischen Erwartungenzu verlieren“, „Die soziale Dynamik von Missachtung“, in: das Andere der 
Gerechtigkeit, p. 104-105. 
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and from the cultural tradition of the political learning they represent in particular8. This is the 
only context in which Honneth uses the concept of culture. As for him, all claiming 
movements belong to the same tradition and that’s the reason why he refuses to distinguish 
between the contemporary identity claims for recognition and the traditional social 
movements. This viewpoint is all the more significant as Honneth attempts to recreate an 
access to the sphere of symbolic goods as mediation towards the public space. This access can 
only be realised through the publicities created in the sphere of work. In that perspective, the 
sphere of work reveals the dialectic between socialisation and individualisation based on the 
demand for recognition. It belongs to the third sphere of recognition conceptualised by 
Honneth, which is the sphere of social esteem. The working context of the individual –even if 
it is not the only sphere of publicity encountered by the individual- plays an important role in 
the way he is recognised in his specificity and therefore in his access to the public space.  Of 
course, this kind of publicity presupposes the existence of common ethical values that 
fluctuate with the historical composition of the society, and particularly with its plurality. This 
is the reason why Honneth mentions the necessity of rethinking and enlarging the concept of 
work as a contribution to social reproduction. It is, in his eyes, the only way to elaborate an 
appropriate concept of the culture, able to play an important role in the thought about 
democracy. 
 
Conclusion 
To finish with, I’d like to lay the stress on the significance of Honneth’s concept of social life 
in his reflections about democracy. Honneth’s purpose is first of all to reflect the social 
conditions of a real integration. The concept of social life leads to a quite radical conception 
of democracy, in which social equality plays a role in its own right and has also the 
precedence over the principle of a democratic constitution of the general will.  
I would like to conclude in relating the significance of the concept of recognition, and 
especially of its actual political implications in my own research. Honneth’s large concept of 
recognition constitutes the starting point of my investigations, which aim at considering in 
what way the concept of recognition could be a kind of mutation of the concept of tolerance in 
the 18th century, and especially in the German Aufklärung. What is at stake in the debate 
                                                
8 „Dieser recht gut belegte Prozess des Sprachraubs (Entsprachlichung) wird durch Prozesse der institutionellen 
Verdrängung der kulturellen Traditionen und politischen Lernprozesse sozialer Widerstandsbewegungen 
begleitet. Das Ausmass, in dem die symbolischen Zeugnisse der Geschichte der Arbeiterbewegung etwa aus der 
öffentlichen Arena der Bundesrepublik ausgeschlossen sind, ist dafür ein plastisches Beispiel“, 
„Moralbewusstsein und soziale Klassenherrschaft“, in: Das Andere der Gerechtigkeit, p. 120 – 121. 
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about tolerance in the Aufklärung is the process of acceptation of the other. Does this 
acceptation always involve a similarity between the subjects of the tolerance and in that way 
the adaptation of at least one of them? Is it possible to accept the other in his radical 
difference and in his specificity? This is the question Honneth tries to answer with his analysis 
of the possible recognition of the particularity of the personal social contribution, which 
constitutes the third dimension of recognition. Honneth considers this third sphere as a 
product of the historical changes appeared at the end of the 18th century with the separation of 
the legal recognition and the social esteem; and with the transition from the category of 
honour to the one of dignity. In so far, the third dimension of recognition related by Honneth 
in his ethics of recognition seems to be an appropriate viewpoint to consider retrospectively 
the debate of the 18th century. 
 
 
 
Bibliography: 
 
 
HONNETH Axel, Kommunitarismus. Eine Debatte über die moralischen Grundlagen 
moderner Gesellschaften, Campus Verlag, Frankfurt am Main 1993. 
 
HONNETH Axel , Das Andere der Gerechtigkeit. Aufsätze zur praktischen Philosophie, 
Suhrkamp, Frankfurt am Main 2000. 
 
HONNETH Axel, FRASER, Nancy,  Umverteilung oder Anerkennung ? Eine politisch-
philosophische Kontroverse, Suhrkamp, Frankfurt am Main 2003. 
 
HONNETH Axel , Verdinglichung, Suhrkamp, Frankfurt am Main 2005. 
 
RENAULT Emmanuel et SINTOMER Yves (dir.), Où en est la théorie critique ?, 
La Découverte, Paris 2003. 
 
WELLMER Albrecht, Endspiele. Die unversöhnliche Moderne. Essays und Vorträge, 
Suhrkamp, Frankfurt am Main 1993. 
